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Abstract 
Purpose – Although strategic persistence remains a key issue in change management and 
strategy literature, our understanding of strategic persistence in the face of other businesses’ 
failure remains limited. This article examines factors that determine strategic persistence in 
the face of other businesses’ failures.  
Design/methodology/approach – Through a review and synthesis of the multiple streams of 
research, we provide a number of explanations for strategic persistence. The study 
complements the analysis with illustrative cases of failed companies. These led to 
development of an integrated framework of explanations for strategic persistence in the wake 
of other businesses’ failures.  
Findings – The analysis led to identification of individual, firm-specific and environmental 
factors rooted in past events (i.e. past successes, prior commitment and decisions by the top-
management team), present circumstances (i.e. nature of the failure) and future outlook (i.e. 
paradox of success, looming threats and opportunities), which foster strategic persistence. We 
uncovered that persistence may also stem from factors such as “paradox of success” and “too 
much invested to quit”.  
Research limitation/implications – We suggest that organisations can learn from others’ 
failures without compromising their values by drawing on the expertise released by failed 
firms. The study also identified various mechanisms through which organisations can learn 
from the failure of others and factors that constrain them from doing so.  
Originality/value – Our theorisation and conceptualisation of the literature accommodates 
the multiple and contrasting perspectives of the subject such as the environmental buffers and 
paradox of success.  
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Introduction  
Over the past few decades, the academic literature and popular press have become 
increasingly replete with stories of business failures (Desai, 2011; Carter and van Auken, 
2006; Heine and Rindfleisch, 2013). One of the reasons for the regular occurrence of business 
failure is that firms often persist with the status quo and fail to learn from their own and 
others’ failures (Baumard and Starbuck, 2005). Although strategic persistence can be 
beneficial when the environment is stable and there is a clear understanding of cause-effect 
relationships, persistence in the face of environmental shifts such as regulatory changes, rival 
businesses’ failures and technological breakthroughs can be fatal to the organisation (Audia 
et al., 2000; Meyer, 1982; Lant et al., 1992).  
One of the most basic strategic decisions and least understood aspects is why organisations 
fail to learn from others and persist with a current course of action in the wake of others’ 
failures (see Lant et al., 1992). Despite a body of research on business failure and strategic 
persistence, lack of integration of the literatures has obscured past progress and, as such, our 
understanding of the consequences of business failure and why firms engage in strategic 
persistence in the face of other businesses’ failure, remains severely limited (see Kisfalvi, 
2000). Furthermore, the existing research has uncovered strains, contradictions and lack of 
clarity of factors that determine strategic persistence after others’ failures.  
Our primary objective is to help address this deficit in our understanding by examining 
factors that determine strategic persistence in the face of rival businesses’ failures. The 
secondary objective is to articulate the effects of business failures. In an attempt to address 
this theoretical deficit, we synthesise multiple streams of research and perspectives on 
strategic persistence to develop a novel integrated framework to explain why some firms 
remain inattentive to the failure of others. In so doing, we move beyond the two-way 
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explanations of strategic persistence articulated by Schwenk and Tang (1989) to present a 
more comprehensive level of analysis.  
We further contribute to the literature by advancing an integrated theory of post-business 
failure effects to shed light on both the positive and negative consequences of business 
failure. Here, we reconcile the two competing views towards enriching our understanding of 
the subject. Cumulatively, we contribute to the burgeoning stream of research on strategic 
persistence (Jansen, 2004; Park et al., 2011).  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The article begins by articulating the 
consequences of business failure. We then set out the main schools of thought on strategic 
persistence in the wake of others’ failures and then present a synthesis of perspectives. We 
conclude by outlining a number of promising avenues for future research on business failure 
and strategic persistence.  
The consequences of business failure: A conceptual integration 
Before we proceed to examine strategic persistence, there is a need to articulate the various 
effects of business failure that await some firms that fail to learn from others’ failures. 
Business failure in this context refers to a situation where the firms cease to exist due to the 
inability to identify and respond to changes in their environment (Watson and Everett, 1993). 
Although business failure may stem from factors such as poor business decisions, lack of 
skilled personnel to foresee strategic implementation, mismanagement, faulty routines and 
processes, and poor attitude to work, organisations with a greater degree of foresight can 
anticipate and respond to the early warning signals and thereby mitigate eventual failure. The 
post-business failure effects are an umbrella concept encapsulating the effects of exit on 
organisations, individuals and groups (Lang and Stulz, 1992).  
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Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought on the effects of business failure: positive 
and negative externalities, as articulated in Figure 1. Business failure has a knock-on effect 
on other firms connected or unconnected to the operations of the failed firms.  
The negative externalities’ perspective contends that in the wake of others’ demise there are 
negative effects that befall individuals and organisations connected or unconnected to the 
departed firm. There are various negative effects of the experience such as stigmatisation of 
the individuals and loss of legitimacy. The experience of business failure may tarnish former 
employees and owners’ employment prospect in societies where failure is stigmatised. The 
distress and uncertainty emanating from the failure can have a profound effect on employees 
who may have devoted their time and invested their career ambitions in an organisation 
which has now lost its legitimacy and ability to exist (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009). This view 
indicates that when companies cease to exist, it can have a devastating effect on families and 
local communities, and disrupt the lifestyle of those whose livelihood depended on the 
existence of that organisation (Ginter et al., 1992). For a business owner or employee, failure 
means cessation of their sources of income which can have devastating effects on their 
livelihood.  
Another aspect of the effects of business failure is that it can sometimes lead to increased 
regulation across industries as governments strive to mitigate the contagion effects of the exit 
(Hora and Klassen, 2013). This was evident following the global financial crisis in 2008. This 
is often attributed to the need to mitigate the potential that failure in one industry has the 
potential to precipitate the demise of firms in the same or other industries (Platt, 1989). There 
is growing evidence, however, that recruiting employees from failed firms has been found to 
lead to diffusion of faulty routines, cognitions, processes and outmoded skills, which may 
contribute to the demise of the recipient organisation (Amankwah-Amoah, 2014). Therefore, 
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there is a need to ensure minimisation of diffusion of faulty practices stemming from others’ 
failures.  
The other school of thought – the positive externalities – asserts that in the wake of 
organisational demise, there can be some positive news stemming from the bad news (Lang 
and Stulz, 1992). Interestingly enough, a mounting body of research has suggested that the 
exit of such firms not only paves the way for the emergence of new organisations, but also 
releases resources and capabilities such as skilled workers to the market, for whom new and 
existing firms compete (Pe’er and Vertinsky, 2008). This stream of research argues that there 
are some businesses that thrive on the exit of others by receiving new customers and rising 
share prices (Amankwah-Amoah, 2013).  
Firms that have been historically constrained by limited expertise can recruit employees 
released by departed firms to respond to new environments. Pe’er and Vertinsky (2008, p. 
285) put it this way, “reemployed skilled workers that were released when their firm exited 
can bring to the new entrant, in addition to know-how related to the technical aspects of their 
skills, relationship capital, ideas about best practices and operating procedures, and perhaps 
more importantly, the lessons from failures that might have caused the exit of their former 
employer.”  
The knowledge generated by failed firms can be expropriated by surviving firms through 
sources such as employee turnover across firms, interactions with suppliers and customers, 
publications in the trade literature, and patents (Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007; Knott and Posen, 
2005).  
A vast body of research has stressed the inherent value of organisations learning from their 
own and others’ failure experiences (Ingram and Baum, 1997; Madsen and Desai, 2010). 
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Learning from others’ failure does not necessary entails major changes to the underlying 
competences of a firm, it may entail modest changes to the current routines, processes and 
procedures (see Henderson and Clark, 1990). Although some firms can benefits from 
expertise release following other departure, they may also inherit faulty routines and 
processes, which may emerge over time, thereby turning the initial advantage into a 
disadvantage and vice versa. Therefore, there is a need to implement measures to ensure that 
they learn the right lessons from the departure.  
Although some knowledge about failed firms can be accessed through public channels such 
as the popular press and trade journals, firms rarely make a concerted effort to recruit the 
former employees to help learn the right lessons of a failed firm (Amankwah-Amoah, 2011). 
It must be noted that visiting the former businesses’ premises, plants or buildings is unlikely 
to yield any fruitful insights of the organisational structures and processes adopted by 
managers that contributed to the demise of the firms. Organisational failure can foster 
strategic persistence in cases where the rival firms gain from the exit by suddenly received 
more customers’ orders or experiencing a sharp increase in its share prices.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Figure 1 summarised the various effects of business failure on outside firm. The figure also 
demonstrates that former employees’ mobility and information diffusions from the failed 
from to outside firms. As described in detail later, three illustrative cases (i.e., Swissair, 
Sabena and Air Liberté) provide insights on how business failure can lead to strategic 
persistence in the outside firm. Having articulated the consequences of business failure, we 
now turn our attention to the explanations for strategic persistence. 
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Explanations for strategic persistence in the wake of others’ failures 
Strategic persistence refers to “the extent to which a firm’s strategy remains stable over time” 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990, p. 487). However, Audia et al. (2000, p. 837) defined the 
concept as “a tendency for firms to stick with strategies that have worked in the past”. Taken 
together, strategic persistence in this context refers to a decision by the top-management team 
of a firm to maintain a current course of action regardless of counterinfluences, failures of 
other businesses and enticing alternatives.  
We contend that strategic persistence has two main dimensions: short-term and long-term 
(see Figure 2). Short-term persistence is defined here as persistence immediately after the 
event. This is where the outside firm concludes that there are potentially useful lessons but 
the unevolved nature of events means that persistence is the right course of action. On the 
other hand, long-term persistence is where the outside firms conclude that the failure is 
attributed to firm-specific factors and therefore offers no useful insight for their businesses.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
Our review of the literature led to the identification of broad categories of factors that explain 
strategic persistence in the wake of other businesses’ failures. Below, we explicate these 
various perspectives on the subject.  
The “locked-in” and “locked-out” perspectives  
This perspective holds that largely due to large resource and capabilities commitment and the 
desire to reap early-mover advantages; firms can become “locked-in” to certain markets and 
strategies and “locked-out” of others leading to a period where they maintain the status quo 
and are unable to pursue or even respond to looming opportunities and challenges in the 
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operating environment (Ghemawat, 1991; Kraatz and Zajac, 2001; Gilbert, 2005). The 
organisation then reaches an equilibrium which then allows strategic persistence to flourish. 
This perspective is rooted in the concept of escalation of commitment advanced by Staw 
(1981). This concept argues that there is a tendency for some top executive to escalate 
commitment to failing courses of action even in the face of negative feedback (Brockner, 
1992; Staw, 1981).  
As the competitive landscape evolves and other firms fail, existing firms often have to decide 
whether to maintain their current strategy or change course. When the firm decides to 
examine their environment for a range of responses, they may be constrained by factors that 
encourage strategic persistence.  
The “too much invested to quit” perspective 
One of the main pillars of the “locked-in” notion is the “too much invested to quit” (Teger, 
1980) perspective. This view contends that the “cost of strategic change” or switching cost is 
simply too high for organisations to pursue and then commit to the status quo (Rumelt, 1995; 
Schwenk and Tang, 1989). Switching costs refer to the financial and nonfinancial costs 
incurred by the firm as it shifts its strategic focus and changes underlying resources and 
routines to learn from others (see Holland and Shepherd, 2013).  
Strategy change may require organisations to deviate from the well-established practices and 
routines, new resource commitment and deployment, and a shift in thinking. The firm may 
have committed so many resources and capabilities to the current course of action such that it 
becomes difficult to admit failure and change course but rather presses on regardless of other 
businesses’ failures. In addition, some firms may face financial and human capital constraints 
that force them to maintain the current course of action (Milliken and Lant, 1991).  
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Another dimension of this perspective but related to the above is the sunk cost effect. The 
sunk cost effect is ‘‘a maladaptive economic behavior that is manifested in a greater tendency 
to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made’’ (Arkes 
and Ayton, 1999, p. 591). There is the contention that sunk costs and industry exit barriers 
constrained firms from engaging in strategic change (Schwenk and Tang, 1989). In cases 
where the alternative strategy entails higher financial cost such as cost of divestment, the firm 
is more likely to persist with the current strategy (Holland and Shepherd, 2013; Karakaya, 
2000). There is a general tendency in human behaviour to persist with a current course of 
action when sunk costs have taken place than to deviate or add to it in an attempt to learn 
from others (Arkes and Ayton, 1999).  
Although some firms may seek to exit the market with declining prospects and following 
others’ failure, they are often constrained by high exit barriers such as government regulation 
and contractual arrangements which limit managers’ ability to act and the range of options 
available. Long-term commitments often constrained firms from changing existing strategy 
by redeploying the resources elsewhere or divesting from a particular line of business due to 
recent changes in the environment. Barriers to exit play an influential role in encouraging 
strategic persistence in the wake of other businesses’ failure. In some cases, the firm might be 
operating at a loss or on low margins but constrained by exit barriers (Karakaya, 2000).  
A premise of this argument is that staying on the current course of action with proven 
resources and capabilities is more efficient than attempting to develop new ones and the 
complexities involved (Levitt and March, 1988). The reluctance of organisations to learn 
from others’ failure may stem from the inability to attend to changes in the environment. 
Accordingly, persistence entails the decision to maintain existing commitments and avoid 
deviating from the current strategy in the face of a changing environment. Strategic 
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persistence might simply be a reflection of organisational commitment to a particular strategy 
or chosen direction of travel (Grossman and Cannella, 2006).  
Illustrative cases: SwissAir, Sabena and Air Liberté 
To illustrate these lines of argument, we turn to the cases of two defunct European airlines, 
Swissair and Sabena. Sabena was a Belgian national airline which collapsed in 2001. The 
airline was founded in 1923 and became Europe's second oldest airline prior to exit (BBC, 
2001a). The firm enjoyed some successes for some time and then collapsed with debt of 
around 2bn euros ($1.8bn) and in so doing became Belgium's biggest ever corporate failure 
(BBC, 2001a,b). At the time of exit, the government controlled 50.5% stake and the 
remaining 49.5% owned by Swissair.  
Following the sharp decline in global air travel in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, Sabena’s more than 70 years of service, heritage, experience and reputation was 
insufficient to sustain its operations (Flint, 2000). The airline was unable to respond 
effectively and subsequently ceased operations. However, the airline’s problems far preceded 
this event and had been brewing for years.  
Following the acquisition of the stake in Sabena by Swissair for Sf267 million in the 1990s, a 
number of factors within the firm affected Swissair’s ability to implement major changes 
which ultimately contributed to the demise. The most notable was the strikes over proposed 
cost reductions by Sabena's unions which eventually led to the exit chief executive Pierre 
Godfroid in January 1996 (Sparaco, 2010). The departure paved the way for Paul Reutlinger 
to be seconded to Sabena from SAirGroup as a “peacemaker” to help bring on-board the 
firm’s “notoriously militant unions” (Flint, 2000, p. 41). The new approach was beneficial in 
brining stability.  
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However, this change put off the painful and urgent need of reforms to reduce staff level and 
cost to reposition the airline for the future. As Buerkle and Anderson (2002, p. 24) put it this 
way, Paul Reutlinger “bought labour peace, but at the expense of Swissair's cost-cutting 
goals: Instead of the intended one-third reduction in the airline's payroll, Swissair's head 
count jumped about 70%”.  
In December 1992, when Swiss voters rejected the country's bid to join the European 
Economic Area and in so doing affected Swissair’s ability to expand and exert influence its 
partner, Sabena (Buerkle and Anderson, 2002). At the time, the European Union law 
deprived such non-European Economic Area airlines opportunity to take the majority control 
of their airlines. As a result, the Swiss airline was constrained and therefore unable to 
“exercise real management control to integrate the two airlines' fleets and routes to reduce 
costs” (Buerkle and Anderson, 2002, p. 24).  
The inability to change the status quo within the subsidiary also affected effective integration 
of functional areas such as marketing, sales and human resources. Consequently, both Sabena 
and Swissair collapsed in 2001 and 2002 respectively partly attributed to the barriers to 
change in both organisations. Indeed, months before the Swissair’s collapsed, it run out of 
cash and several aircrafts were seized (Olson, 2001; Bonsu, 2001). Both cases help to 
illustrate how inability to change and cost of change can lead to business failure. 
One of the companies affected by the demise of Swissair was its former Swissair subsidiary 
Air Liberté. It was founded in 1987 was declared bankrupt and ceased operation in 2003 with 
3,200 job losses. Air Liberté’s over-reliance on Swissair for funding and scheduled payments 
meant that when Swissair collapsed its sources of finance were terminated and thereby 
precipitated the incremental collapse of the airline.  
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In an attempt to disentangle itself from the various underperforming partners, Swissair 
promised regular payments to subsidiaries such as Sabena, AOM and Air Liberté. In 
September 2001, Air Liberté and AOM decided to merge to become Air Lib, however, just a 
month after the formation Swissair was declared bankrupt and therefore all planned payments 
and exiting fees were never realised which put the firm on permanent path of decline leading 
to exit. Swissair's inability to fulfil the exit fee of 1.3bn French francs ($174m) for AOM/Air 
Liberté meant that the operations of Air Lib was no longer sustainable in the face increasing 
competitions (BBC, 2003). This event left Air Lib “at the mercy of its creditors” as several of 
its planes were confiscated (BBC, 2001b).  
One factor that has been strongly linked to strategic persistence within the firm was the lack 
of financial resources to bring about change and long-term commitments. The constraints 
perpetuated maintaining the status quo which ultimately led to the collapsed.  
The paradox of success perspective  
The paradox of success (Audia et al., 2000) or Icarus’ Paradox (Miller, 1990) perspective 
argues that the tendency to maintain the status quo in the face of changes in the external 
environment and departure of other firms may stem from past successes of the organisation. 
High past performance often breeds overconfidence in the existing processes, resources, 
expertise, routines and course of action, thereby decreasing the chance of any change in the 
firm’s strategy (Amason and Mooney, 2008; Greve, 1998). As organisations enjoy 
uninterrupted successes over a period of time, the success of the past strategies may emerge 
to undercut the need to develop new resource or capabilities, let alone learn from the failures 
of other firms in their industry or beyond.  
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A growing number of studies have suggested that past success discourages information 
processing and consequently strategic persistence (Boeker, 1997; Lant and Montgomery, 
1987). The tendency to stay the course can be attributed to decision-makers’ inability to 
update and upgrade their prior cognitions and beliefs with new information by committing 
additional resources to a previous chosen course of action (Guler, 2007; Tetlock, 1985). 
Largely due to their past successes, they become less attentive to the disappearances of other 
firms and tend to repeat their mistakes. This perspective provides considerable evidence that 
the decision to persist with existing courses of action is attributed to the dedication within an 
organisation to the notion that “it cannot happen here” and “what underpinned our success is 
different”. As organisations become increasingly confident in their existing routines, 
practices and policies that have delivered success, the capacity and willingness to learn from 
others diminish (Levinthal and March, 1993; Miller, 1997).  
Over time, successful firms can be “lulled into a false sense of security by relying on 
established beliefs and processes” which then become obsolete and liabilities in the face of 
changes in the external environment (Amason and Mooney, 2008, p. 407; Hedberg et al., 
1976). The past successes can create conditions that force managers to persist with a current 
course of action and “blinds them to early signals that past strategies may fail” (Audia et al., 
2000, p. 837). Indeed, Audia et al. (2000, p. 849) put it this way, “the very success that 
organizations strive to achieve plants the seeds of their possible future decline. Once 
organizations achieve success, their natural tendency is to continue to exploit the strategies 
that worked in the past”.  
Another dimension of the paradox of success perspective is the reinforcement-expectancy 
model of learning which contends that firms are more likely to replicate processes, practices 
and routines that are linked to positive outcomes (Cyert and March, 1963; Prahalad and 
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Bettis, 1986). The self-reinforcement occurs when a set of events decreases the attractiveness 
of a course of action relative to others and thereby forcing strategic persistence to occur.  
The paradox of success differs in subtle ways from the related concept of escalation of 
commitment advanced by Staw (1981). First, paradox of success is rooted in the “belief that a 
previously winning course of action will succeed in the future”, whereas the escalation of 
commitment is “caused by the belief that a previously losing course of action will succeed in 
the future” (Audia et al., 2000, p. 850; Staw, 1981). Second, in the case of escalation of 
commitment, decision makers assume that environmental conditions are likely to differ and 
become more favourable in the future, whereas the Icarus Paradox supposes the conditions 
will be the same (Audia et al., 2000).  
Our contention here is that strategic persistence in the face of other businesses’ failure creates 
conditions that allow complacency and inattentiveness to the environment to thrive. 
Therefore provides a partial explanation of why companies in the same sector often fail in 
succession and for the same reasons. Organisations are more likely to learn from failure than 
successes partly due to the very high cost of failure and the paradox of success (see also 
Desai, 2011). Learning from failure and success is more likely to be punctuated periods of 
strategic persistence as some firms attempt to make sense of the changes in the environment.  
Another related line of research has suggested that the phenomenon of a “success trap” (Rhee 
and Kim, 2014). This represents a situation where an existing routines and practices of the 
focal firms linked to past success are replicated “at the exclusion of alternatives, resulting in a 
failure to adapt to changes in the environment” (Rhee and Kim, 2014, p. 2). The rigid 
routines and processes advocated and practice managers constrain the firms’ ability to adapt 
and respond to environmental shifts in timely manners (Rhee and Kim, 2014; Gilbert, 2005).  
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Illustrative cases 
To shed light on the above theories further, we turn to the airline industry in Africa in the 
early 2000s and the case of airlines such as Ghana Airways, Nigeria Airways and Air 
Afrique. The beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by the growing number of 
internet users and an incremental shift from paper tickets to paperless tickets in the industry. 
Prior to these airlines’ collapse in the early 2000s, many European airlines had faltered, partly 
due to their reliance on the traditional model which entailed payments of commission and 
charges to travel agents, and competition from low-cost rivals.  
As more foreign counterparts switched from outmoded technology and methods of doing 
business, such as reliance on travel agents and ticket offices to sell the flight tickets and pay 
commission, these firms continued their strategies of reliance on the traditional distribution 
channels. These once successful airlines appeared to have become so welded into these 
practices of using mainly travel agents well past the point of utility in the early 2000s when 
most airlines had made giants step towards a paperless booking process.  
In addition to the difficulties involved in coordinating between the airlines’ headquarters and 
high-street travel agents, the airlines also had to pay commission. These, in tandem with the 
extensive network and historically financial supports of their states, made the top-
management team so confident in the firms’ ability to compete and become successful in the 
future. Indeed, it was well established at the time that the internet was the cheapest way to 
make a booking with an airline (The Economist, 2005). The escalating commitment in terms 
of resource commitment and investment to develop a network of travel agents across the 
world inhibited the adoption of the new technology and made it costly for the firms to 
operate. In these cases, the historical investment in building the network of travel agents 
made it difficult for the firms to abandon their current course of action without betraying the 
 17 
trust of hundreds of agents who relied on them for their revenue stream. These factors played 
a major role in the three airlines’ collapse (Amankwah-Amoah, 2010; see also Pirie, 2014). 
The late adoption of online ticket selling affected their ability to compete on cost in an 
environment where low fares were a major source of competitive advantage.  
As the number of air travellers booking over the internet around the globe surges, the airlines 
still focused mainly on using travel agents. The firms also resisted a shift from the traditional 
model partly due to low internet adoption in their countries. On many international routes, 
they were competing against Western and Middle East airlines that had successfully adopted 
an online booking strategy much earlier.  
Eventually, all the above firms ceased operations partly attributed to intense competition and 
inability to develop a sustainable cost base (see Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 2010, 2014 
for detailed analysis). These cases clearly show the potential outcome of organisations that 
are unable to learn from the failure of others in their industry. Indeed, subsequent new 
entrants such as Ghana International Airline, founded in 2005 after the failure of the three 
airlines, also experimented with the traditional model before eventually shifting from using 
the outdated approach of relying on travel agents (Amankwah-Amoah, 2010). By the same 
token, strategic persistence can be an attempt by the top-management team not to lose face.  
The psychological perspective  
The psychological perspective of strategic persistence contends that managerial decisions are 
influenced by prior cognitions, experiences, situations and characteristics of the top-
management team (Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989; Milliken and Lant, 1991). Past studies 
indicate that prior history, and present conditions and perspectives on the future constitute the 
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decision-maker's psychological field and influence the strategic decision to maintain an 
existing course of action (Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989).  
A growing body of scholarly works suggests that executives who formulated past strategies 
are often unwilling to discard them and even acknowledge the validity of information that 
suggests a need to deviate from the failed past strategies they have championed (Milliken and 
Lant, 1991; Lant et al., 1992). Top executives “who champion or sponsor a project stand to 
benefit most from its success and have the most at stake if it fails” and therefore more likely 
to persist with the status quo (Guler, 2007, p. 252). This is partly because such top managers 
are often eager to take credit openly for projects that have produced exceptional outcomes for 
the business and therefore become increasingly reluctant to alter the current course of action 
(Guler, 2007; Miller, 1990, 1994).  
“Corporate success encourages managers both to credit and take credit for their own policies, 
then to publicly endorse and tie their reputations to those policies, and ultimately to become 
bound to the preservation and extension of the policies” (Miller, 1994, p. 327). Indeed, top 
managers “may become psychologically invested in the strategies they have designed, 
creating the tendency to persist with past strategies despite negative performance outcomes” 
(Lant et al., 1992, p. 603).  
An important feature of this psychological ownership of the existing firm’s strategy is that 
executives tend to respond to early warning signals of decline by limiting “their search for 
new information, ignoring information that reflects negatively on the current strategy” 
thereby bolstering their current course of action (Westphal and Bednar, 2005, p. 262; 
Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989).  
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Another aspect of this perspective is that strategic persistence is influenced by social and 
psychological factors (characteristic of the top executives) associated with organisation 
tenure (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Park et al., 2011). The characteristics of the top-
management team, such as prior experiences, their perceived status and values, influence 
their strategic choices and the decision to maintain the current course of action or change in 
respond to environmental shifts (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). Indeed, when confronted 
with looming challenges and the need to change the course of action, long-tenure executives 
engage in minimal or no strategic change relative to short-tenure teams (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1990). This reinforced the assertion that outside successors are less likely to 
persist with current strategy and more likely to initiate major strategic change. Long-tenured 
senior executives have been found in past studies to demonstrate greater “commitment to the 
status-quo” (Hambrick et al., 1993).  
One recent and promising stream of research has indicated that top executives who receive 
high levels of flattery and opinion conformity (i.e. ingratiation) are more likely to become 
over-confident in their abilities and leadership as well as existing processes and routines, and 
are therefore more likely to persist with the current course of action even in the face of poor 
firm performance, let alone the failures of others (Park et al., 2011).  
Another psychological factor that explains why companies persist with a current course of 
action can be attributed to the concept of “pluralistic ignorance” articulated by Westphal and 
Bednar (2005). Pluralistic ignorance can be defined as “a situation in which virtually all 
members of a group privately reject group norms [practices, or policies, or have concerns 
about them] but believe that virtually all other group members accept them” (Miller et al., 
2000, p. 103). This occurs when, in the face of decline and changes in the external 
environment, outside directors fail to express their concerns about the current course of action 
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which then perpetuates the status quo whilst at the same time decreasing the chance of any 
response or subsequent strategic change within the firm (Westphal and Bednar, 2005).  
Although top executives and employees might be aware of issues and problems that warrant 
the need to change the current strategy, they often fail to voice their views and thereby create 
conditions that perpetuate the status quo (Morrison and Milliken, 2000). Strategic persistence 
can be attributed to reluctance by group members and employees to speak up about their 
disagreements with the current course of action or report bad news (Hutt et al., 1995). 
Although boards of directors have been identified to play a pivotal role in counteracting 
executives’ tendencies to persist with a failing course of action, they often fail in this task 
(Westphal and Bednar, 2005; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).  
An illustrative case 
To examine shed light on these perspectives, we turn again to the case of Swissair. One of the 
foundational causes of the firm’s demise can be traced to top executives’ desire and 
perceptions. In the mid-1990s, in an attempt to turn the airline into a major player alongside 
dominant airlines such as BA, Air France and KLM led to the adoption of the so-called 
“Hunter strategy” (Doganis, 2006; The Economist, 2001). The strategy entailed acquisition of 
stakes in multiple airlines including Sabena, Air Littoral, AOM, Air Liberté and TAP across 
Europe (The Economist, 2001). The rapid expansion in the financially weak airlines 
diminished the resources of the firm.  
A number of factors that have been strongly linked to the persistence with the “Hunter 
strategy” are the “arrogance” and desperation of the top management team to “punch above” 
their weight in the global industry (Kay, 2007; Bonsu, 2001). More importantly, the “Hunter 
project” was driven as the brainchild of Philippe Bruggisser, who immediately after his 
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appointment as chief executive in the mid-1990s adopted the strategy and, emotionally and 
psychologically invested in the project (Kay, 2007). The personal investment and prior 
commitments to the project became a barrier to change even in the face of other airlines’ 
demises and planted the seeds of its destruction.  
However, the dismissal of the Philippe Bruggisser in early 2001 paved the way for the airline 
to begin to undo the strategy, which was no connected with “reality” (Kay, 2007). It was 
therefore not surprising that his replacement in 2001 as chief executive Mario Corti 
immediately brought an end to the strategy and thereby casting further doubt on the 
soundness of the strategy. This was just before the firm collapsed. One of the enduring 
consequences of the firms collapsed has been the increasing recognition that persistence with 
losing course of action can accelerate and lead to failure.   
An environment interpretive model  
The basic tenet of this theory is that strategic persistence stems from understanding and 
interpreting the business environment by the top-management team. There are several strands 
to this theory.  
One strand of this perspective is the “environmental buffers”, which holds that firms 
endowed with rich financial, social and human capital can be “buffered” from changes in the 
business environment, which then encourages persistence with the status quo (Kraatz and 
Zajac, 2001; Milliken and Lant, 1991). Slack can be defined as “the pool of resources in an 
organisation that is in excess of the minimum necessary to produce a given level of 
organizational output” (Nohria and Gulati, 1996, p. 1246). It includes under-utilised capacity 
and redundant employees, which can be effectively deployed to mitigate the effect of 
environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982). Slack resources can create a sense of security and belief 
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that current changes in the environment are more likely to be “temporary or unimportant” and 
therefore warrant inaction (Milliken and Lant, 1991, p. 138).  
Proponents of this perspective have indicated that rich resources encourage strategic 
persistence by fostering a false sense of security in the future and “desensitising” decision-
makers to environmental shifts (Kraatz and Zajac, 2001). Resource-rich firms can 
temporarily maintain the existing course of action irrespective of the nature of businesses in 
their industry or operating environment (Levinthal, 1990).  
In a related but distinct area, it has been suggested that persistence may stem from managers’ 
interpretation that the changes in the environment are “short-lived” with limited long-term 
consequences (Lant et al., 1992). This decision can be attributed to factors such as a short 
recession or a national disaster, which precipitated the sudden changes in the environment but 
unlikely to affect the business in the future. One of the key themes of the logic is that top-
management teams are often unlikely to track the things that are considered to be unimportant 
including the failure of other firms; rather executives deploy resources and expertise to home 
in on factors that explain the current success (Miller, 1990).  
Another strand of this perspective contends that top managers who engage in strategic 
decision making are often “flooded with information” but have limited capacity to process 
the information and make sense of other businesses’ failures (Lant and Hewlin, 2002; Lant et 
al., 1992). As such, they face a difficult task of deciding which information to attend to and 
which to discard, and often opt to maintain the status quo (Lant and Hewlin, 2002). This view 
advocates that lack of fruitful knowledge of the departed firms often presents managers with 
incomplete information which makes it difficult to implement any change. Persistence may 
be an outcome of organisational inertia or ineffective information processing within the firm 
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(Hambrick et al., 1993; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Levinthal, 1992; Huang et al., 2013; 
Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996).  
The traditional economic theory views business failure as part of the national selection 
process where weak firms in their industry cease operations largely due to intense 
competition (Miner et al., 1999). This suggests that external forces such as deregulation, 
lower entry barriers and sudden changes in government policies drive inefficient firms out of 
the industry and frees up previously occupied resources for surviving firms (Delacroix and 
Carroll, 1983; Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007).  
A central theme of this view is that the causes of failure are attributed to uncontrollable 
factors rather than firm-specific factors (Gimeno et al., 1997). Organisations and managers 
that view other businesses’ failure is a natural selection process, where weak firms are 
upstaged by nimble and efficient rivals are less likely to be attentive to changes in the 
external environment. Therefore, there is little incentive for executives to deviate from the 
previously endorsed course of action to learn from others. Yet while these arguments go far 
in enhancing our understanding of environmental factors, they offer no useful insights on 
firm-level factors which make firms reluctant to learn from others’ failure. Given the one-
sidedness (i.e., external factors) of this perspective, for a better of the concept this theory as a 
standalone perspective is insufficient and needs to be integrated alongside with the firm-level 
perspectives. Some scholars have linked strategic and organisational inertia with centralized 
decision-making processes, which constrained line managers from responding to changes in 
their environment (Whetten, 1987).  
 24 
An illustrative case 
To illustrate these lines of argument, we turn again to the case of Air Afrique (1961-2002). 
The rise and fall of the airline offers useful insights on how strategic persistence and inability 
to change course in timely manners can sealed the fate of once symbolic firm. The firm was 
owned and controlled by more than 11 African nations. As such, the countries provided 
regular cash injection to maintain its services and key routes to national capital of the states. 
The cash injection and subsidies catered for loss-making services and “buffered” the airline 
from making necessary reforms such staff reductions and reducing unprofitable routes as the 
environment changes and multiple African airlines failed in the same environment. The firm 
persisted with staff level even as more customers shift to rival airlines (Amankwah-Amoah 
and Debrah, 2014).  
By the late 1990s, more customers had switched to rival airlines and the cost base was 
unsustainable. Indeed, not only did the top executives maintain the existing strategy, they also 
lobbied for government protection and against air transport liberalisation. The high level of 
persistence within the firm has been referred to as the “escalating indecision phase” – a 
stalemate (Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 2014). These factors eventually culminated in the 
firm’s demise.  
Synthesis of research and theoretical perspectives 
In synthesising the literature on strategic persistence in the wake of others’ failure, we invoke 
Bateman and Zeithaml’s (1989) notion that strategic decisions influenced by prior history, 
present circumstances and future outlooks. As discussed above, strategic persistence is 
shaped by a variety of factors rooted in past events (i.e. past successes enjoyed by the firm, 
prior commitment and decisions by the top-management team), present circumstances (i.e. 
 25 
nature of the failure, magnitude of the effects on the business) and perspectives on the future 
(i.e. similar environment in the future paradox of success, looming threats and opportunities).  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Table 1 summarises the various theoretical perspectives and their underlying logic in 
explaining strategic persistence in the face of other businesses’ failures. It also highlights the 
features of the decision to persist with existing courses of action whilst others fail. Guided by 
these schools of thought, we advocate a shift away from viewing these perspectives as 
competing views. Rather, they are complementary views geared towards stimulating a better 
understanding of the subject. Taken together, the analysis led to identification of firm-level 
and environmental factors rooted in the past, present and future outlook, which determine 
strategic persistence (see Table 1).  
There are multitudes of factors that determine whether competitors’ failures might affect the 
strategic persistence of the outside firm. These factors include firm size, network 
embeddedness, market power, and resource endowments. It is important to note that strategic 
persistence is more likely to occur in the wake of the failure of a small business than global 
firm largely due to the limited nature, scope and impact of their operations. However, the 
failure of a major player with an extensive network of suppliers, customers and allies, is more 
likely to lead to a shift in strategy among those connected to the firm and beyond. To provide 
further insights on how firm size and market power influence other firms’ decisions to 
maintain their current strategy or engage in strategic change, we turn to the failure of Lehman 
Brothers.  
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Due to the extensive network of the partners in more than 50 countries with around 2,985 
legal entities, the failure following the global economic crisis in 2008 forced the numerous 
partners to respond to the failure by seeking new partners and expertise (Cornford, 2010). 
The unanticipated loss of such large firms with control over key resources triggered a range 
of strategic and systematic responses by firms connected to its operations to ensure their 
long-term survival. In this particular case, the network embeddedness quickly shifted from an 
asset to become a liability following the collapse of the core network player (see also Uzzi, 
1997) and those in this case that failed to adapt in a timely manner eventually closed doors 
and ceased operations (Cornford, 2010).  
Another moderating influence is that large organisations are often guided by well-established 
structures and bureaucratic processes which often prevent them from changing (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984). It has been suggested that when the threat to the business remain ambiguous, 
organisational leaders are unlikely to adopt new practices for fear of undermining factors that 
have contributed to their current success (Gilbert, 2005).  
Discussion and implications  
The paper sought to examine factors that determine strategic persistence in the wake of other 
businesses’ failures. We have reviewed a range of theories that help us to better understand 
how and why some firms persist with a current course of action and questionable strategies 
even after others’ exit. The study complemented the review with illustrative cases of failed 
companies such as Swissair, Sabena and Air Liberté. Our theorisation and conceptualisation 
of the literature led to the identification of a number of firm-level and environmental factors 
rooted in organisation history, the present and those expected in the future, which broadly 
determine the decision to persist with a current course of action in the wake of other 
businesses’ departure. The analysis uncovered factors such as the perils of success, structural 
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inertia (stemming from tendency to repeat past actions), and “too much invested to quit”, 
which constrained firms from learning from the failure of others and encourage strategic 
persistence.  
Our analysis lends support to the notion of Icarus Paradox (Miller, 1990) and articulates the 
firm-level processes that allow past successes to breed over-confidence and inattentiveness to 
changes in the internal environment including the failure of other firms. The analysis also 
lends support to the assertion that the increasing occurrences of business failures can be 
partly attributed to the perils of success which obstruct the need to learn from others and 
adapt to change in the external environment. This echoes findings of studies on organisational 
decisions that have suggested that the tendency to save face in the face of negative feedbacks 
stemming from the business environment, forces firms to overlook the failures of others and 
encourage strategic persistence (Guler, 2007; Schwenk and Tang, 1989). 
Contributions to theory  
The paper makes contributions to the literature on business failure and strategic persistence. 
In addition to enriching our understanding of strategic persistence in the face of changes in 
the competitive landscape, this study contributes to the burgeoning streams of research on 
organisational failure that have examined why some organisations and top executives fail to 
learn from others or even learn the wrong lessons from the failure of others (Finkelstein, 
2006).  
Although recent research suggested the need for firms to learn from the failures of others 
(Desai, 2011), firms often remain reluctant or inattentive to others’ failure. This study departs 
from the current stream of research that has focused mainly on the causes of business failure 
to integrate multiple strands of research to delineate the sources of and explanations for 
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strategic persistence. In so doing, we respond to past studies that have called for a better 
understanding of strategic persistence (Westphal and Bednar, 2005).  
Contributions to practice 
Notwithstanding these contributions to literature, there are practical implications that stem 
from the analysis. First, this research highlights the need for organisations to create 
conditions that foster learning from others as an ongoing strategy for sustainable success. 
There is a need for organisations to develop and upgrade their existing capabilities and 
resources to respond to environmental shifts. As business failures become increasingly 
common and well known, there is a need for firms to identify those failures that offer useful 
lessons for the future and firms also need to know when to persist with their current strategy 
and ignore the failure of others.  
By creating a long-term plan to learn from others, firms would be equipped to minimise the 
effects stemming from others’ failure. In addition, there is a need for organisations to engage 
in more incremental resource commitments to projects to provide space and time to re-
evaluate and thereby providing strategic options to maintain or discontinue the current course 
of action at various stages (Guler, 2007). Such safeguards and incentives provide 
opportunities to assess the environment and learn from the exit of other firms. This is 
important given that organisations often lose track on when and how to discard previously 
successful strategies even in the face of similar firms’ failure (Audia et al., 2000; Miller, 
1990).  
Furthermore, our findings suggest that in some organisations, changes in top-management 
teams may be required to counteract strategic persistence forces. Such leadership changes 
have been found to bring about strategic reorientation (Lant et al., 1992). One of the 
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limitations of our work is that it is context specific and focuses on only strategic decisions in 
the face of business failure. There is clearly an opportunity for future research to extend the 
existing streams of research on “post-exit effects” (Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007) to include 
the strategic behaviour of bystander organisations in the competitive arena. Such an analysis 
would significantly enrich our understanding of the subject.  
Future research may build on this work by examining the effects on strategic persistence in 
mitigating the “spillover” of other businesses’ failures. The existing works barely touch on 
the subject and much deeper analysis is required. In closing, more research is needed to 
provide a more detailed analysis of strategic persistence in the face of other businesses’ 
failure than has been achieved here.  
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Table  1: Theoretical explanations for strategic persistence in the face of other businesses’ failures 
Theoretical 
paradigm 
Key premise  Level of 
analysis 
Representative studies 
and contributions 
Exemplary 
cases  
New logic 
The “locked-
in” and 
“locked-out” 
perspectives  
 
 Strategic persistence is a convenient and less costly 
approach. It is explained by exit and entry barriers. 
 
Firm-level 
factors 
 
Arkes and Ayton, 1999; 
Teger, 1980; Rumelt, 1995; 
Schwenk and Tang, 1989; 
Karakaya, 2000; 
Ghemawat, 1991; Kraatz 
and Zajac, 2001; Gilbert, 
2005. 
SwissAir 
and Sabena 
History, 
present 
circumstances 
and 
perspectives 
on the future. 
The paradox 
of success  
 
 Past successes breed over confidence and inattentive 
to changes in the external environment e.g., 
overconfidence in existing competences and under-
estimating competition. 
 There is a general tendency to repeat actions that 
deliver success and overlook learning from failure. 
Firm-level 
factors 
 
Audia et al., 2000; Amason 
and Mooney, 2008; 
Hedberg et al., 1976. 
Ghana 
Airways, 
Nigeria 
Airways 
and Air 
Afrique 
Psychological 
perspective   
 
 Psychological factors such as prior history, present 
condition and future outlook determine the decision 
to maintain existing course of action. 
 Groups persist with current course of action, 
routines and strategies that members of the group 
Individual-
level 
factors 
 
Amankwah-Amoah, 2014; 
Bateman and Zeithaml, 
1989; Milliken and Lant, 
1991; Rumelt, 1995.  
SwissAir 
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privately disagree with. 
An 
environment 
interpretive 
model  
 
 Strategic persistence stem from “environmental 
buffers” and interpretation of the business 
environment.  
 Business failures stem from uncontrollable factors 
to which top executives have little or no control. 
External 
factors 
 
Kraatz and Zajac, 2001; 
Milliken and Lant, 1991; 
Amankwah-Amoah, 2014. 
Air Afrique 
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Figure 1: An organizing framework of the consequences of business failure   
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Figure 2: An organizing framework of the dimensions of persistence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
